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Abstract
This article aims at proposing new ways in which economic analysis can be
applied to important issues related to security of energy supply. More particularly,
we show how the real options theory may be a convenient tool to analyze the
uncertainties surrounding the development of unconventional gas. We lay emphasis
on the main economic features related to investment in this highly sophisticated
technology which may contribute to address the needs of a world increasingly hungry
for energy.
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1 Introduction
In a complex and multipolar world, ensuring reliable access to su¢ cient quantities of
energy is more than ever a priority. The challenge we face today is to provide new options
for and solutions to one of the most important strategic issues, security of energy supply.
Recent times have seen an increasingly complex environment for the energy industry.
As stated in Figure 1, the energy sector is characterized by heterogeneous markets, by
regulatory risk and also by di¤erent industrial structures. It also involves di¤erent players
(governments which must understand the hurdles for large scale investments, companies
which must adapt to new technical changes), fragmented regulatory regimes, various
infrastructures and geologies with di¤erent skillsets, and also distinct public perceptions.
Figure 1: Main drivers in energy eld
In this context, the energy security issue must be studied within a multidisciplinary
framework where technical, economic and political aspects are treated together. Economic
theory is increasingly applied for the decision-making process in this eld. In a world
where resources are limited (some much more than others) and forcasts are very dicult,
it is essential to make a selection and prioritization of investement projects. In this sense,
the application of economic principle is necessary, as it helps to compare the benets of
a project with the costs incurred to obtain them. Altghough trivial, this approach faces
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important challenges like heterogeneous benets and costs or di¤erent time horizons:
some projects have known benets, but uncertain costs, or vice versa. Investements in
the energy sector provide an example of such tricky features.
Our paper investigates the applicability of the real options theory to security of en-
ergy supply, with a main focus on the highly challenging issue of the developement of
unconventional gas. The objective here is to show how real options provide an adequate
toolbox to answer the following research question: how economic modeling may comple-
ment institutional analysis to tackle the investment decision in a context characterized by
uncertainty and exibility?
We organize the study into four sections including this introduction. In the second
section, we explain the main context of the gas market with particular emphasis on the
shale gas developement. In the third section, we draw attention to the foundations of real
options analysis and we present some important directions to be used in our modelling
framework. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Energy security in Europe: the gas example
Security of energy supply requires the solution of a double challenge: diversifying energy
sources while securing supply routes. To understand how this double challenge can be
resolved in Europe, it is necessary to study European energy policy. In this sense, we lay
emphasis in this section on security of gas supply and the main choices made in Europe.
2.1 General context
The growth of electricity demand in Europe, the environmental constraints due to the
greenhouse e¤ect and the uncertainty related to the nuclear sector make natural gas the
preferred fossil fuel for electricity production in the future. Since the late 1990s, gas has
become a strategic commodity to rival even oil. In a context where priority is given to
the reduction of greenhouse gases, gas has a comparative advantage since it generates
less CO2 compared to other fossil fuels (coal, oil) and requires less government support
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than renewables. It also has a great exibility in its use: it can be engaged to generate
electricity or incresingly in the operation of vehicles. Therefore, the gas consumption has
been widely projected to grow worldwide.
According to World Energy Outlook of the International Energy Agency (IEA) from
2011, gas could contribute to the transition from a world dominated by fossil fuels to
the one where the renewable sources would begin to signicantly weigh in the long-term
future, well beyond 2030. Still, whether natural gas will have an important role in meeting
energy demand will depend on its price. In the European Union, which currently imports
more than a half of its gas, international trade has been made through long-term contracts
(20 to 30 years) with clauses that index gas prices to those of petroleum products (Figure
2).
Figure 2: The gas price correlated to the petroleum products Source:
In the following gure we can observe a signicant disconnection from the month of
April 2009 between the market prices and the long-term prices indexed to oil.
4
Figure 3 : Year-ahead gas prices, Source:
The explanation resides in the fact that in 2008 a number of forces converged to
determine this disconnection. Given the economic crisis and the recession, gas demand
felt sharply while the gas supply increased. In addition, the rapid developpement of the
shale gas in United States had an important inuence on the global gas market and on
pricing systems.
Percebois (2011) points out that the global outlook for natural gas usage in the elec-
tricity production recently increased after the disaster at Fukushima. Some countries
using nuclear power have decided to phase out the nuclear (Germany, Switzerland in
particular), others have renounced to use it (including Italy), and others have decided
to reduce the share in their electricity mix (Japan, Spain). In this new climat all these
countries must decide what type of energy they can turn to. We know that coal is pollut-
ing, that oil is relatively expensive and polluting and that renewable energy (wind, solar
photovoltaic) is expensive and requires subsidies. Given these constraints, it makes sense
for many countries to turn to gas in order to generate electricity. But although gas prices
remain high in Europe, in the United States prices are low because of the emergence of
shale gas.
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2.2 Unconventional gas: a resource for the future?
Unconventional gas1 emerged as a promising solution for gas production in Europe in 2008,
after rapid development in the United States. Nowadays, unconventional gas accounts for
at least 25% of the American gas production. This makes the term "unconventional"
somewhat strange2.
In a recent report by the European Commission (Pearson et al., 2012) the unconven-
tional gas is seen as a possibility to make it easier for the European Union to meet its
future energy needs. This can be done by increasing domestic production or by reducing
demand for gas in other parts of the world. The development of unconventional gas may
also cause natural gas prices to fall. In addition, the high costs and uncertainties related
to the long-distance transport may also explain why some countries from Europe are now
interested in the exploitation of unconventional gas on their territories.
Even if unconventional gas is more expensive to produce than conventional gas, it has
two major advantages: it may be an alternative energy to the polluting coal and nuclear
energy and it helps to reduce the energy dependence of some countries. (to be completed)
However, the environmental constraints related to the utilization of this type of gas
are not negligible. The extraction requires large amounts of energy and water (15000
m3 of water per well drilled). Also, the massive use of chemicals increases the risk of
groundwater contamination. Related to these type of risks, the fact that population
density is much higher in Europe than in the United States makes some concerns more
actives (the extraction places are often close to residential areas).
All these features imply that it is up to the scientists and experts in the eld to
debate the issue, by highlighting the risks and the benets of the exploitation of such
1Unconventional gas is natural gas which is extracted using additional processes beyond the standard
drilling techniques. There are three categories of unconventional gas: shale gas, tight gas and coal-
bed methane (Pearson et. al., 2012). The new report from the IEA on the potential "golden age" for
gas (2011) mentions the discovery of signicant reserves of unconventional gas. This may change the
production and the energy supply in the future.
2United States possess more than one hundred years of consumption (60 Tm3 of unconventional gas
and 7Tm3 of conventional gas ), which is equivalent to the reserves of Russia.
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deposits. However, given that we live in a world increasingly thirsty for energy and where
signicant technological advances are expected in the eld of exploration and production,
it is unlikely that unconventional hydrocarbons will be abandoned altogether.
3 Taking decisions under uncertainty
Many studies and discussions concerning the advantages and the disadvantages of uncon-
ventional gas focus on the qualitative analysis of the issue, but few studies give emphasis
to a quantitative analysis from regulators point of view. It is well known that every
public policy involves some uncertainty and involves some risk taking, both at individual
and at collective level. Faced with this inescapable fact, the policymaker is not totally
helpless. Economic calculation may be an instrument of decision support. We show in
this section how economic theory can incorporate the uncertainties, the irreversibility and
the managing felxibility which may be available in the developement of unconventional
gas. Although we dont aim to provide a complete model of the problem, our intention
here is to highlight some potential paths of how the economic theory, and especially the
real options concept, can be used to evaluate investments in this eld.
3.1 What type of economic analysis should be favored?
Policy makers in the energy eld are faced with the task of balancing the objectives of
security of energy supply with those of cost minimization and environmental preservation.
All these objectives interact in the optimization problem of maximizing social welfare
through the use of various policies. Consequently, the ability to adjust decision according
to arrival of new information over time is essential.
When we research security of energy supply and investments in new sources of energy,
we discover two specic aspects related to the issue of unconventional gas development:
uncertainty and irreversibility.
Firstly, the signicant uncertainties mainly refer to the evolution of energy demand,
to unconventional gas resource potential outside the United States, to the cost of pro-
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ducing unconventional gas (the technological progress is uncertain), to the strategies of
conventional gas exporters, to the environmental risks associated to unconventional gas
production or to changes in the cost of transport (we know that the unconventional gas
is interesting if it is located close to markets, but what about the need to carry it over
long distances). To these uncertainties one can add the uncertain potential impact on the
energy mix, on energy prices or changes in the political and legal environment.
Secondly, the investment in the exploration of unconventional gas is a highly specic
task that requires an enormous amount of technical and nancial resources. This kind of
project involves large sunk investments costs and thus, a strong degree of nancial irre-
versibility. Moreover, some of the environmental damage resulting from unconventional
gas production may also be irreversible. It will be some time before enough data has been
collected to understand the risk associated with unconventional gas production.
The issue of controlling the uncertainty has given rise to a large and complex litera-
ture in the economic eld. Many economists tried to tackle the problem of investment
under uncertainty in a distant future, by creating di¤erent economical models which made
history to this day. They tried to investigate how to represent the scientic uncertainty
and how to integrate this criterion in a decision dilemma. Somehow they succeeded when
they developed the benet-cost analysis, which became over the time, one of the most
applied theories on investment decision. This technique of analyzing choices has some
characteristics and di¢ culties of economic ways of thinking that need to be reconsidered
for each particular situation. When the information is uncertain or cannot be quantied,
the benet-cost analysis rapidly shows its inconsistency. On the contrary, the real options
theory provides a more complete framework for project evaluation when uncertainty and
irreversibility are central to the decision problem. In the following subsection we present
the interplay between these two economic approaches.
3.1.1 Shortcomings of traditional tools under uncertainty
Generally, the traditional method of Discounted Cash-Flows implies the evaluation of
costs and benets over time of the possible allocations in order to choose the one whose
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present value is highest. Even so, this procedure presents shortcomings: it undervalues
investments under uncertainty.
When we deal with projects involving very large amounts of capital, high risks and
uncertainty, we nd that most of them have a negative Net Present Value during the eval-
uation. This traditional method cannot capture the exibility because it focuses only on
two components of value creation: discounted payo¤s and investment cost. The decision
is static, taken once for all, without the possibility to change the future characteristics of
a project.
3.1.2 Characteristics of options perspective
In order to complement this traditional method and to take into account possible adjust-
ments to the parameters of a project in an uncertain environment we may turn to the
concept of option value. Deciding to invest immediately (a decision which is said to be
irreversible) restricts the possibilities for action in the future. On the contrary, choosing
to wait (a reversible decision) o¤ers the opportunity to reconsider the decision later: in
this way, a real option is created. In this sense, the real options theory considers the deci-
sion in a dynamic framework, meaning that it is not evaluated only on the basis of direct
costs and benets, but on all its consequences. The real options approach provides a more
dynamic and proactive view of investment decision, viewed as now or later instead of
now or never. The main advantage of the concept of real option comes from the fact
that it overcomes the disadvantages of the traditional analysis of the investment.
Since the 80s, real options theory is a modern approach used to better analyze strategic
decisions in domains with a high degree of uncertainty and a signicant dimension of
temporality: the natural resource exploration, the energy industry, the biodiversity, etc.
At least two reasons explain the success of real option theory. On the one hand, it
permits us to take into account the dynamic feature of innovation, and more generally,
the accumulation of information over time (scientic, geopolitical, ...). The discount rate
and distribution of future earnings are no longer the only central points of the evaluation.
On the other hand, the theory comes within the scope of the theories of decision and
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basically helps us to answer the following question: what is the cost to be supported
today in order to preserve a wider exibility for a future decision? This cost can involve
the technical costs or constraints, but also the social constraint (it is possible to consider
a "willingness to pay" for current generations).
The main contribution of the optional approach is that it recognizes from the outset
that the company may adjust its investment strategy to the circumstances of the moment.
The idea supporting the concept of real options is that an investment opportunity can
be compared to an option: the rm making an investment acquires the option, and then
retains this option until a specic date, or until an opportunity arises. Depending on
whether the circumstances are favourable or not, it will exercise the option - and reap the
gains - or abandon it. This "managerial exibility" has value, and must be considered
in evaluating a project. The total value of a project consists of a part of the NPV, and
secondly the value of option on this project. It is therefore understandable why a project
can be attractive despite the NPV negative.
The implication of uncertainty and irriversibility for projects involving potential envi-
ronmental impacts was widely examined in the economic literature.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) are the rst to create a general model to generate the
appropriate time to develop a project to extract natural resources. They include in the
decision to change the status of the project three types of real options: the option to
wait, the option of close and the option to reopen the mine. They show that precisely this
option value of changing between the various states should be included in the analysis.
For example, they demonstrate that a project should remain open until the point where
the income plus the value of the option to reopen will equal the value of variable costs.
On the contrary, a project is expected to remain closed until the point where revenue
equals the variable costs plus the option of closing.
Fisher and Hanemann (1987) also study an investment project concerning the devel-
opment of an environmental resource. They consider that the potential environmental
costs are uncertain like other costs and returns.
Pindyck (2000) consider that there are two main uncertainties that must be treated
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in a project with environmental implications: the uncertainty over the environmental
evolution, i.e. ecological uncertainty and the uncertainty over the future returns, i.e.,
economic uncertainty. He concludes that an increase in the uncertainty of future costs
and benets of a project aiming to reduce the negative impact on the environment, may
lead to an increase in the estimated threshold for adoption.
More recently, Bretschger and Smulder (2006), Lin et al. (2007) and Saltari and
Travaglini (2011) rene these seminal works by taking into account the ecological uncer-
tainty, i.e. the inuence of the pollution seen as an externality on the decision-making
process.
We follow this recent strand of literature and we propose in the following section a
simple model which simultaneously includes the uncertainty, the irreversibility and the
negative externality on the environment for an investment project of unconventional gas.
3.2 Unconventional gas: a real option example
The policy-makers in the eld of unconventional gas are facing the special features men-
tioned above. They must learn to manage them and to adapt to them. In this sense, a
number of guiding principles can help them to manage this complexity.
First of all, it is better to follow a gradual exploration process and to keep the invest-
ment options opened, in order to clearly understand the uncertainty and the potential
upside. Also, learning the processes and the continuous improvement can be a key to
focus on core areas and reduce unit cost and externalities.
Secondly, exibility may be also a key issue. It is better to "keep all the options. It
is advantageous to have exible plans, to be able to make decisions today that can be
reversed tomorrow, when we are in possession of new information (ie adapt quickly to
technological changes or political developments). Generally, it is important to maintain
some exibility in choosing long term decisions.
Moreover, the development of the unconventional gas industry in Europe is a problem
that indicates the limitations of existing regulatory instruments and the future challenges
that will face policy makers. However, this is a new industry which incorporates a familiar
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economic theme: the exploitation of a natural resource. Given that this activity should
take place in habited areas, there is an important social aspect which must be taken into
account. Because the population is much richer than before and therefore she gives more
value to her environment, she is not willing to sacrice the quality of life at any price.
In this case the regulator must choose between preserving this natural resource or
starting its use. The decision must take into account the presence of environmental
externalities and the social welfare of undertaking an investment in the exploration and the
extraction of this type of gas. The potential damage on the environment may be important
and most of all, irreversible. Generally it is not fully known before the developement of
the activity. If new information may become available over time, there may be a value
to wait rather than start a project with a stochastic outcome. The uncertainty regarding
the externalities may be reduced with the new information revealed over time. Therefore,
the question is of how much to invest and which is the optimal time to begin development
of the project. Under uncertain circumstances, the exibility to wait or to invest has an
option value which is a part of the projects total value and thus it must be evaluated.
Given the fact that the developpement of unconventional gas has characteristics of a
public good like the non-excludability and the non-rivalness, the appropriate context to
study the problem is the policy makers point of view. The economic models of optimal
extraction and the cost-benet analysis are appealed to tackle the decision rule. For the
rst type of models, the decision rule inuences the rate at which exploitation should be
undertaken given expectations about the demand, the price of commodity or the cost of
extraction. For the letter type of models, a project is developed if the net present value
of benets exceeds the net present value of costs.
When new information arrive over time, the policy maker has the exibility to use
it and thus to choose the optimal time and amount of development. Therefore, in the
following model we question about when (if ever) is optimal to invest in the shale gas
development which comes with potential environmental consequences, and how much (if
any) investment should be used.
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3.2.1 A simple model
We propose to focus in this model on the uncertainty of environmental costs, which are
seen like a negative externality. This externality must be incorporated on the decision-
making function.
Let us consider an undeveloped reserve of unconventional gas which is analyzed by
a social planner. If the reserve is not developed, it may have a value derived from the
preservation of the local ecosystem. If the reserve is developed there may be an economic
value for its use because it can supplement the overall supply of energy. But the use
of this reserve entails important costs for the infrastructure and the exploitation as well
as unknown environmental costs. In order to construct an exhaustive evaluation of this
alternative, the latter type of costs must be taken into account. We state that this costs
(environmenal externalities) are stochastic given that future information regarding tastes
or discoveries are revealed with the passage of time. The social planners knowledge about
the environmental externalities changes continuously. The following di¤usion process
describes their evolution over time:
dmt = (mt + I)dt+ mtdw; for t >  (1)
The evolution of this costs depends on the amount of investement only from the
starting time of the development,  : The new information concerning changes in the envi-
ronmental impact is subject to the white nose process, dw:The drift and the instantaneous
standard deviation of the process are represented here by  and :
Before the investment begins, the social planner waits for new information which may
change the expectation that environmental impacts are too costly to justify the use of
the reserve. In this period, the environmental cost depends only on the current known
impact and the stochastic change:
dmt = mtdt+ mtdw; for t   (2)
In the following we are interested to nd the optimal level for the environmental cost,
m for which the level and the timing of the investment in the shale gas processing facility.
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The value of the reserve developement is given by the private net outcome (return) less
the environmental externality stemming from the deployment of the resource. We assume
that these impacts on the environment begin when the project is started and continue
indenitely:
V (mt) = max
;I
Et(v(I)e
 r  
1Z

mse
 srds) (3)
where v(I) is the net present value of the private return, I is the level of investment,
r is the dicount rate, ms is the incremental externality on the environment in the period
s,  is the starting time for developement.
In order to nd V (mt) we rst calculate the level of environmental impact for which
the social planner will undertake the development of the gas reserve.
The decision to develop the shale gas reserve may be analyzed within an optimal
stopping problem where  is the optimal stopping time and m is the boundary between
the stopping and the continuation regions.
The expected value of environemental costs is given by the second term from equation
(3), E
1R

mse
 srds:In the stopping region s   , the environmental cost evolves accordingly
the process stated in equation (1).
After appropriate derivations (Appendix 1), the expected value of environemental
impacts is given by the following expression:
E(
1Z

mse
 srds j  ; I;m ) =
1Z

e srE(ms j  ; I;m )ds (4)
= e r (
I
r(r   ) +
m
r   ) = e
 rf(m ; I)
The optimal threshold may be found by solving the problem from the continuation
region, before the investment is started. Let us note with F (m ) the value of the project
at the boundary:
F (m ) = v(I
)  f(m ; I) (5)
where I is the optimal investment.
Then, the maximization can be rewritten in order to nd the solution of the problem
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in the stopping region :
max

E

e r (v(I)  f(m ; I))

(6)
for dmt = mtdt+ mtdw; t  
In the continuation region, the optimization principle of Bellman yields:
rV   1
2
2m2tV
00   mtV 0 = 0 (7)
with the additional conditions which must hold at the boundary:
V (mt) = F;mt  m (8)
where F represents the value of the project after the developement and V is the value
of the opportunity to develop. The equation (8) states that the value of the developed
project is at least as large as the value of waiting for more information as long as the
environmental impact is smaller than the threshold, m .
V 0(mt) =
@F (I;mt)
@mt
; for mt  m (9)
 rF + mt @F
@mt
 0; for mt  m (10)
V > F; for mt > m (11)
The condition (11) states that as long as environmental costs exceed some critical
level, it is more protable to wait, maintaining the opportunity to invest, V.
In the continuation region the solution has the following form:
V = Amt +Bm

t (12)
with the following expressions for parameters  and  :
 =
 
1
2
2   +q(  1
2
2)2 + 22r
2
(13)
 =
 
1
2
2    q(  1
2
2)2 + 22r
2
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The substitution of the solution for equation (7) to conditions (8) and (9) allows us
to calculate the coe¤cients A and B. We also state that mt = m
Am 1 +Bm
 1
 =  
@f
@m
(14)
Am +Bm

 = F
Moreover, the use of Kramer rule gives:
A =
m
@f
@m
+ F
m (   )
(15)
B =
m
@f
@m
+ F
m (  )
After substituting (5) for F into condition (10) and rearranging, we obtain the optimal
level of environmental cost as follows:
m = rv(I)  I
r    (16)
Knowing the threshold for the environmental costs we are interested to nd the opti-
mal investment level. By substituting equation (4) into the maximization function from
equation (3), V (mt) becomes a function of investment, of the stopping time, and of the en-
vironmental cost when the investment is made. The solution will be given by the following
program, with r >  :
I = argmaxE

e r (v(I)  f( ;m ; I))

(17)
dmt = mtdt+ mtdw; for t   ; r > 
The optimal time and evnvironmental cost for undertaking the development of the
reserve the optimal investment is found by di¤erentiating (17) with respect to I and then
equate to zero. With the transposable function v(I), we obtain the relation for the optimal
investment:
I = v
0 1


r(r   )

(18)
We observe that the socially optimal size of investment is smaller than the amount that
a private rm would consider, Ip = v
0 1 (0) : This is explained by the fact that generally
the latter does not take into account the environmental externality.
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If we di¤erentiate equation (16) with respect to I (Appendix 2), we can study the
relationship between the optimal accepted level of environmental costs ans the level of
investement as following:
dm
dI
= rv
0
(I)  
r    (19)
The substitution of (18) for v
0
(I) involves that for I = I; m reaches its maximum:
dm
dI
=
8>>><>>>:
> 0 for I < I
= 0 for I = I
< 0 for I > I
(20)
The relation (20) implies that it is necessary to wait for a decrease in the environmental
costs before starting the developement. If mt < m ; waiting to invest is not justied
because the incurred externality is su¢ ciently small and the social planner may have
incentives to invest immediately. For any level of investment superior to I(the private
optimum) may require a lower level of m . A level of investment inferior to Iwill involve
private benets, but these benets are too small to counterblance an increase in the
environmental cost.
The inuence of the social time preferences on the optimal time of investement may
be analyzed by di¤erentiating m with respect to r (Appendix 3) :
dm
dr
= v +
I
(r   )2 > 0 (21)
If the future is less important for the society, then a greater amount of environmental
costs is tolerated and a smaller amount of discounted future returns is required from the
investment. If the society pays a small attention to the future environment, involving
the use of a higher discount rate, there is a grater expected cost for the environmental
externality.
4 Conclusion
Our paper illustrated the implications of the uncertainty, the irreversibility and the envi-
ronemental externalities on the decision making process in the developement of an uncon-
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ventional gas reserve. We used the real options theory as a robust method to discipline
the public decision-making in this specic context.
It is shown that if the environmental costs are uncertain and if the social planner is
able to defer the starting time of an investment, then it is optimal to wait until an optimal
level of costs related to environmental externalities before investing. The value of new
information adds an economic value to the opportunity to delay the developement of the
gas reserve to a future date, until the environmental cost associated decreases. Moreover,
because the government adds the externality to its objective function it is expected and
it is shown in the model that the private optimal level of investment is higher than the
socially optimal threshold. Clearly, the resource is worth less to society because the latter
incurs the cost of the externality.
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